Inadmissible aliens a Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admissionExcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States: B Waiver authorized For provision authorizing waiver of certain clauses of subparagraph Asee subsection g. B Multiple criminal convictions Any alien convicted of 2 or more offenses other than purely political offensesregardless of whether the conviction was in a single trial or whether the offenses arose from a single scheme of misconduct and regardless of whether the offenses involved moral turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were 5 years or more is inadmissible. C Controlled substance traffickersAny alien who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe— i is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance or in any listed chemical as defined in section of title 21or is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such controlled or listed substance or chemical, or endeavored to do so; or ii is the spouse, son, or daughter of an alien inadmissible under clause ihas, within the previous 5 years, obtained any financial or other benefit from the illicit activity of that alienand knew or reasonably should have known that the financial or other benefit was the product of such illicit activity, is inadmissible.
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney.
Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him.
At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible. This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago.
Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions. We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings.
We have undertaken a thorough reexamination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution -- that "No person. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle.
And, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured "for ages to come, and.
Over 70 years ago, our predecessors on this Court eloquently stated: The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not uncommon even in England.
While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the [p] questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.
The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand.
But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.
In stating the obligation of the judiciary to apply these constitutional rights, this Court declared in Weems v. United States, U. Under any other rule, a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas.
Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The [p] meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction. This was the spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the manner in which the constitutional rights of the individual could be enforced against overzealous police practices.
It was necessary in Escobedo, as here, to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not become but a "form of words," Silverthorne Lumber Co.
And it is in this spirit, consistent with our role as judges, that we adhere to the principles of Escobedo today.Admissions & Financial Aid. Invest in yourself. No trust fund is required. Value and versatility are hallmarks of an SCC education. You can rise to the challenge of higher education here without the fear of falling into a mound of debt.
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